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Abstract
We present a connectionist model of event knowledge that is
trained on examples of sequences of activities that are not
explicitly labeled as events. The model learns co-occurrence
patterns among the components of activities as they occur in
the moment (entities, actions, and contexts), and also learns to
predict sequential patterns of activities. In so doing, the model
displays behaviors that in humans have been characterized as
exemplifying inferencing of unmentioned event components,
the prediction of upcoming components (which may or may
not ever happen or be mentioned), reconstructive memory,
and the ability to flexibly accommodate novel variations from
previously encountered experiences. All of these behaviors
emerge from what the model learns.
Keywords: events; schema; scripts; prediction; recurrent
connectionist model

Introduction
We know many things about the world. How that
knowledge is organized, its content, and how it is stored,
accessed, and learned have been the subject of semantic
memory research for some time. A long and rich tradition of
scholarship has produced a relatively stable set of
theoretical constructs that are used for discussing this kind
of knowledge, including categories, concepts, and features.
But people also possess another type of knowledge that
has been long recognized as extremely important, although
it is less clearly understood. This is knowledge about
common situations and events, and has been referred to by a
range of names, including pragmatic knowledge and world
knowledge. Such knowledge appears to serve multiple
purposes. It guides our own behavior, and helps us interpret
the behavior of others. We use this knowledge to anticipate
the consequences of events as they unfold. We use this
knowledge extensively in language understanding to make
inferences about unstated components of situations that may
be incompletely described.
Bartlett (1932) was one of the first psychologists to talk
about the role of such knowledge in memory. Later, in the
1970s and 1980s, cognitive psychologists such as Bransford
and colleagues demonstrated that event knowledge is
important in encoding and retrieving details about
situations. Garrod and Sanford, among many others, showed
that this kind of knowledge supports inferences in language

comprehension. One assumption that appears to be shared
(though was often implicit) was that the use of
world/pragmatic/event
knowledge
in
language
comprehension occurred at late stages in processing. In
large part this reflected theoretical assumptions of the time
in linguistics and psycholinguistics, but it is also true that
the typical experimental tasks used at the time were off-line,
and did not lend themselves to tracking real-time
incremental processing.
Over the years, there have been a number of attempts to
formalize this kind of knowledge, giving rise to mechanistic
explanations involving frames (Minsky, 1974), scripts
(Schank & Abelson, 1977), schema (Norman & Rumelhart,
1981), and stories (Mandler, 1984), among others. Although
the core intuitions motivating these proposals were widely
accepted, the actual implementations revealed a number of
challenges. Templates were inherently rigid and inflexible.
Yet most situations admit a large range of variation and
novelty. Moreover, many situations involved blends of
multiple events. Symbolic architectures did not lend
themselves to dealing with such challenges. Thorny
questions were raised and not satisfactorily answered: What
is an event (and what is not)? What is the content and detail
of event knowledge? Does event knowledge have a structure
common across all event types? How is event knowledge
accessed and used? How is event knowledge learned? These
questions remain open to this day.
Several recent developments have encouraged cognitive
scientists to focus more intensely on event knowledge and
how best to model it. Our own interest arises from work in
language processing using real-time measures to examine
processing as comprehenders deal with incrementally
presented input. There is now considerable evidence that
event knowledge plays a significant role in comprehension
very early in processing, indeed, guiding expectations even
in advance of input being received. The time course of how
this knowledge is accessed and deployed is now not only of
great theoretical interest (insofar as it may constrain our
theories about the cognitive architecture underlying
language understanding), but has become something that
can be measured empirically.
A second development has been the emergence of nonsymbolic computational frameworks that demonstrate the
ability to capture behaviors that simultaneously reflect
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awareness of global abstractions as well as sensitivity to
ways in which those abstractions may be graded and
affected by subregularities and even idiosyncracies. Both
Bayesian and connectionist models have these qualities. Our
research uses a connectionist model because they exhibit
key additional capabilities. They learn by example, and they
allow us to probe in (simulated) real time the dynamics of
the network’s responses to incrementally presented input.
In the remainder of this paper, we present a model and
report a set of simulations we have conducted. We begin by
explaining the design criteria that guided model
development. These criteria were chosen because we
believe they are needed to model processes that reflect the
use of event knowledge in human behavior. We conclude by
discussing what we have learned from the model, and ways
in which it might guide future experimental research.

The Model
Design Criteria
The model’s architecture was developed with the goal that it
should have the following four properties.
Learn the components that comprise an activity. We
make the assumption that events can be viewed as
sequences of activities, where activities occur in the
moment and are comprised of various participants,
actions, and contexts. Rather than prespecifying a
template for necessary or sufficient components, the
model must learn which components occur and co-occur
across contexts and sequences. These co-occurrences
may be statistically variable, and the model must learn
these (often high-order) statistical interdependences.
Learn the temporal structure of activity sequences. We
also assume that the temporal structure of activity sequences
that make up an event may be variable across instances of
any given event type. The model must learn this temporal
structure, including cases in which that structure is rigid and
obligatory as well as cases in which there is a high degree of
variability or optionality. The model should be able to use
its knowledge of the temporal structure to anticipate likely
future activities, given previously encountered sequences.
These expectations should reflect both global contingencies
as well as predictions that may reflect more idiosyncractic
variants of an activity sequence. In human terms, the model
should be able to make predictive inferences.
Learn to generalize from specific examples of events.
Although the model will learn from multiple examples of a
given event type, it must learn the (often graded) patterns
that underly them. It must also learn subregularities and if
possible, exceptions.
Fill in missing information. Both during learning and
testing, the model may be exposed to activity descriptions in

which some highly expected information is omitted. The
model should be able to activate missing elements, as
appropriate (pattern completion). In human terms, the model
should be able to make elaborative inferences.

Architecture
The architecture of the model is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

There is a single network, but the left and right portions play
complementary roles. The left portion receives input from
the world in the form of (localist) specifications of potential
participants, actions, and contexts that might characterize
the current activity under description. Each rectangle thus
represents a number of possible inputs of the same category
(agents, patients, etc.). It should be emphasized, however,
that there is no representational status to these groups. As
far as the network is concerned, every input node in all of
these groups is orthogonal to every other node. If there are
similarities in terms of behavior or statistics of privilege of
occurrence, the network must discover them. Input nodes
are fully connected to nodes in the Hidden Unit layer, and
hidden units also connect (with different weights) back to
input units. This use of recurrence allows the network not
only to learn co-occurrence patterns among input units, but
also to implement constraint satisfaction. This means that
after the network has learned, it has the potential to activate
missing elements in an input pattern, as appropriate. The
Next Activity side of the network consists of units that are
identical to the Current Activity units, but the job of the
Next Activity units is to predict which activity will follow,
given the sequence so far. Recurrent connections from the
hidden units back to themselves are critical for this function
because they provide the network with an internal
representation (which must be learned) of the past that can
be used for prediction. This architecture builds on elements
of prior modeling that has provided a strong foundation for
the present approach, including in particular Botvinick and
Plaut (2004), Elman (1990), Rogers and McClelland (2004),
Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986), St.
John and McClelland (1990), and Reynolds, Zacks, and
Braver (2007).

Training and Testing
Simulations were carried out using the rbp package from the
PDPtool simulator (McClelland, 2016). Weights in the
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network were initialized with random values between ±0.1
and adjusted gradually using backpropagation through time
(Williams & Zipser, 2004). Training stimuli were either
artificially generated activity sequences (Studies 1-3)
presented one activity at a time, or sequences obtained from
human norming data (Study 4). After training, testing was
conducted by freezing weights and presenting the network
with input sequences designed as analogs of stimuli used in
human experimental paradigms. Details of the general
training
regime
can
be
found
in
http://tatar.ucsd.edu/jeffelman/EventModelTraining.html,
and details relevant to each simulation are given below.

shows similar activations, but in response to the sequence
John is in the forest; John cuts himself; What happened to
John?

Figure 2

Simulation Results
Study 1: Pattern completion and elaborative and
predictive inferences
Typical language use relies heavily on interlocutors’ shared
knowledge. This allows speakers to omit information that is
assumed to be known by the comprehender, and allows
comprehenders to infer unstated information. A frequent
distinction is made between elaborative inferences, which
involve unstated details regarding an activity currently
described, and predictive (or forward) inferences, which
involve expectations about what will occur next. Bridging
inferences are those in which a comprehender draws on
knowledge only as needed to understand a prior statement.
The extent to which, and conditions under which, such
inferences are drawn remains a topic of debate. Bridging
inferences are largely uncontroversial. However, whether,
and under which conditions, elaborative and predictive
inferences occur is still debated (for review, see Murray,
Klin, & Myers, 1993). In Study 1, we first verify that the
constraint satisfaction properties of the network do support
inference under optimal conditions. We then examine the
fragility or robustness of such inferencing because it has
been claimed that discrepant data have arisen from stimulus
properties and the sensitivity of behavioral measures.
Simulation 1.1 The network was trained on event
sequences that ranged in length from three to six activities.
The sequences might be glossed as (1) John goes to a fancy
restaurant; (2) John is cutting wood in the forest, using an
axe; (3) John (and other people) cut themselves accidentally
with a knife, and he bleeds; (4) John (and other people) cut
themselves accidentally with an axe and the wound is fatal;
(5) Mary and Penny are in the library and Mary asks Penny
a question, which Penny answers. Having learned these
sequences, the model was then tested on novel sequences.
The sequences were novel both in that they omitted critical
information, and they involved new combinations of
activities that the model had not encountered in the same
event. Figure 2 shows activations in the Next Activity units
in response to the input sequence John is in a restaurant;
John cuts himself; What happened to John? (the query takes
the form of simply presenting John without any specified
result, so the network must fill in the information). Figure 3

Figure 3

After receiving the input that John is in a restaurant, a knife
is inferred to be present, whereas in the forest, axe is
activated. These may be considered elaborative inferences.
Then when John cuts himself, with no instrument
mentioned, the network immediately begins to predict the
result that is consistent with the instrument. These are
predictive inferences. Such inferences have not always been
found in humans, however. One possibility raised by
Murray et al. (1993) is that failures to detect predictive
inferences may result from experimental stimuli in which
either the forward inference is disrupted, or it is not tested
soon enough. In Error! Reference source not found., we see
what happens when the discourse is disrupted by switching

Figure 4

to a new topic
(a situation involving Mary) immediately after the cutting
activity. The network begins to predict that John will bleed
(because he is assumed to have cut himself with a knife,
given the restaurant context). However, as soon as Mary is
introduced, the activations of all consequences of cut
decrease sharply. Probing for the consequence of John
cutting himself subsequent to this topic change would show
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little or no evidence of the predictive inference, consistent
with Murray et al.’s findings.
Simulation 1.2 One open question concerns exactly how far
in the future comprehenders predict when processing
incrementally presented language. In much of the
experimental literature focusing on prediction in language,
there has been an implicit assumption that the next word in a
sequence is anticipated by comprehenders, but nothing
beyond that. However, more recent findings suggest that
when language is used to describe an event, comprehenders
anticipate event-relevant elements even at points in the
discourse where they might not be appropriate (Metusalem,
Kutas, Urbach, Hare, McRae, & Elman, 2012). A simplified
example of their stimuli is the short story The crowd is in
the stands. The crowd looks around. The skater goes to the
podium. The audience applauds, The skater receives a ___.
Participants’ brain activity was measured while reading the
final noun. When an event-appropriate word, such as medal,
was presented, the N400 amplitude was small. A final word
that was completely anomalous (e.g., bleach) elicited a large
N400. However, an word that was contextually anomalous
but event-appropriate (e.g., podium) produced an N400 with
intermediate amplitude. The authors interpreted this as
evidence that event elements are activated and available
even at times when they might not be immediately expected.
In Figure 5, we see the network’s activations in the Next
Activity units throughout such a stimulus sequence.

Study 2: Novel Events and Blending
In real life, events not only exhibit variability (which the
model accommodates, as we see in Figures 1 and 2) but
often are combined in novel ways. Fixed templates or rigid
structures are ill suited for dealing with this. In the next
simulation, we test the model’s ability to flexibly respond
when events are combined in unusual ways.
Simulation 2.1 The model was trained on sequences that
included examples of going to a restaurant (as in Simulation
1.1), and activities corresponding to a romantic relationship
between two people (John and Mary), with Mary being
married to a third person (Bill). Furthermore, the model was
exposed to examples of aggressive behavior between
various people (but not including John or Bill). In many of
the latter examples, weapons are used. Gun is a more typical
weapon, but knives are occasionally used. After training, the
model was tested on a sequence that we might gloss as John
and Mary are at a fancy restaurant. John and Mary cut
steak with a knife. Bill enters the restaurant. Bill attacks
John. Activations of relevant nodes are shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6

Figure 5

By the second activity, the network has already activated
two event-appropriate elements, podium and medal; bleach
is not activated at all. As the focus shifts in the fourth
activity back to the crowd, both medal and podium are
deactivated. However, near the end, the network re-activates
both. The re-activation of medal is not surprising because it
has been mentioned explicitly. However, the network has
also learned that podium is the likely location for awarding a
medal and so activates it as well, though at a lower level.
There are two lessons from this simulation. First, behavioral
evidence for the activation of putatively inferred event
elements may depend on the timing of the probe. Second, it
may be that only highly sensitive behavioral measures will
reveal the presence of partially activated event elements.
These elements, even if only partially activated, become
more easily accessible should subsequent discourse make
reference to them. This in fact was seen in Simulation 1.1.

Two things are apparent. First, as soon as Bill enters the
restaurant, the model quickly adjusts its expectations about
what it predicts will happen next. Second, and more
interesting, is that although the model has learned that gun
is the most common weapon used in aggressive behavior,
the presence of knife that was established from the outset
(even prior to its mention) leads to the knife being the
predicted instrument in this new situation. Thus, the model
not only adjusts to a change in sequence structure that it has
not encountered before, but it also flexibly incorporates
relevant components from the first event into the second
event. That is, the model produces a novel response to a
situation it has never encountered before by drawing and
integrating knowledge from different events.

Study 3: Priming
Studies 1 and 2 illustrate examples of priming. There is a
large literature showing that event relevant information
facilitates processing target elements related to that event.
These include typical agents, patients, and instruments
priming their event-relevant verbs, priming between eventrelevant nouns, and verbs priming their event-related agents,
patients, and instruments (for review, see McRae &
Matsuki, 2009). The model exhibits the same behavior, not
shown here because of space limitations. Instead, we
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demonstrate an example of priming involving second order
dependencies between event elements. Bicknell et al. (2010)
found that the patient that is expected to follow a given verb
may depend on the agent carrying out the action. Thus,
shopper saved… primes money, whereas the lifeguard
saved… primes person. (Control conditions established that
the priming was not directly between the agent or verb and
the patient, but that it required the combination.)
Simulation 3.1 The model was trained on various examples
of shoppers and lifeguards (and other people) in events in
which saving was one of the activities. Typically, reflecting
the corpus analyses carried out by Bicknell et al., shoppers
save money whereas lifeguards save people. When probed
with the partial description of an activity shopper+saved
(Error! Reference source not found.), the model predicted
money as the most likely patient, compared to
lifeguard+saved, which led to greater activation of person
(Error! Reference source not found.). However, we also
see that that there is an asymmetry in the responses, such
that at later stages in processing, lifeguard+saved results in
an increased activation of money (though still lower than
person).

investigate these issues, we conducted a norming study to
sample people’s knowledge of types of events.
Norming study 4.1 We used 81 events, drawing on prior
literature that has used stimuli that describe events and
situations. Some of these events have clear goals and
outcomes (e.g., fixing a flat tire). Other events are more
situation-like, in that things happen but the goal and
outcome are less clear (e.g., going to a picnic). Using
Mechanical Turk, participants were asked to list up to 12
activities for each event. Participants saw a random subset
of 10-12 of the 81 events, and each event was presented to
22-24 different participants. Table 1 shows responses from
three participants for fixing a flat tire.
Table 1: fixing a flat tire
Pull over
Get out of car
Open trunk
Get spare tire
Get jack
Remove flat tire
Put on new tire
Tighten lug nuts
Put flat tire in trunk

Get out of car
Loosen lug nuts
Jack up car
Remove lug nuts
Remove flat tire
Put on new tire
Tighten lug nuts
Remove jack

Pull over
Open trunk
Get tire iron
Get spare tire
Put on hazard lights
Jack up car
Remove lug nuts
Take flat tire off
Put on new tire
Tighten lug nuts
Lower car

The data can be visualized using graph analysis, in which
nodes represent activities and directed arrows show
temporal sequence (size indicates frequency), as in Figure 9.
Figure 7

Figure 8

This reflects asymmetries in the training data that mirror
asymmetries in corpus analyses, that is, that save is overall
more commonly associated with money than with people.
We might test the model’s predictions (to our knowledge, as
of now untested) by testing whether the timing of the patient
probe leads to different degrees of facilitation, depending on
when the probe was presented.

Study 4: Learning from Human Data
In the previous simulations, we used training sets that were
designed by hand. The design of the training was controlled
to carefully probe the network’s behavior under different
learning situations. This strategy is similar to that used in
many human behavioral experiments. But in real life,
people’s knowledge of events results from experiences that
may involve considerably greater variability. Consolidating
such experiences and making sense of commonalities,
subregularities, and exceptions is a challenge. Furthermore,
temporal structure may vary considerably not only between
different event types but even within a single event type. For
example, there may be some parts of an event in which the
ordering of activities is consistent and even obligatory (eggs
must be broken before they are fried), whereas activity
sequences in other parts of the event may be optional (one
might make coffee before making eggs, or after). To

Figure 9

Some of the sequences are consistently ordered (e.g., jack
up car > remove flat tire > put on new tire), undoubtedly
reflecting causal constraints. Other sequences may be
performed optionally at different times. How does the model
deal with such data?
Simulation 4.1 The model was trained on the activity
sequences provided by 23 participants for fixing a flat tire.
Of particular interest is that although the model responds
appropriately to the data it was trained on, its responses also
incorporate what it has learned from other participants. The
model thus does not slavishly reproduce the individual
training data, but detects general patterns that are common
across all the data.
Can the model generate activity sequences on its own? We
tested this by seeding the model with a reasonable starting
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activity, and then using the most activated predicted
elements as the subsequent input. This process iterated until
the event was complete. The initial five activities in the
network’s self-generated sequence are shown in Figure 10
(presenting greater than five makes the figure unreadable).
Notably, the network’s self-generated activity sequence is
not identical to any single participant’s sequence. However,
it is a completely reasonable abstraction of the sequencing
across all participants’ descriptions.

Figure 10

Discussion
Our goal was to develop a model that could learn the
structure and temporal dynamics of activity sequences, as
well as the co-occurrence properties of participants,
activities, and contexts in those sequences. Although we
might call these sequences events, the concept of event is
not a primitive in the model and events are not pre-defined
templates. Rather, what we might call an event is an
epiphenomenal consequence of having to learn about
activity sequence structure. Having done this, the
architecture of the model allows it to perform pattern
completion, both in the moment (supporting elaborative
inferences) and across time (supporting predictive
inferences). The model replicates a wide range of behavioral
studies (only a few of which are described herein) for which
event knowledge has been hypothesized to play a role. It
also produces unanticipated behaviors that can be tested
empirically to validate the model.
A great deal remains to be done. The model’s inputs serve
as cues to event knowledge, but the model itself does not
provide those cues. Those cues must come from perceptual
or motor evidence from the world as well as a language
processor. Nor does the model provide an account for how
these various cues can serve to alter focus on different event
elements, including adjusting how the temporal contour of
the event is understood (e.g., by aspect). We are guardedly
optimistic that these are tractable problems and that the
model we propose here provides a solid framework for
understanding how people acquire, represent, and use
knowledge of events in the world.
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